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ance pertaining to it. Accordingly, the 
court rejected the State's argument 
concerning the mother's statements and 
similarly rejected application of the 
present sense impression excep .! .. (0 
the other three out-of-court statements 
made to the victim's sister and to the 
police officers. 
The court of special appeals thus 
rejected each ofthe state's theories on 
admitting out-of-court statements made 
by a victim about his killer to rebut the 
battered spouse syndrome defense. 
Moreover, the highly prejudicial na-
ture of the statements contributed to 
the court's conclusion. Overall, the 
opinion may be helpful to defense at-
torneys who raise the defense of bat-
tered spouse syndrome, self-defense, 
or hot-blooded provocation and must 
prevent the state from admitting out-
of -court statements of the victims in 
rebuttal to such defenses. Most impor-
tantly, however, the opinion clarified 
the hearsay rules regarding verbal acts, 
state of mind, and present sense im-
pression, and thus, sought to prevent 
their misuse by practioners and trial 
judges in the future. 
- Heather L. Ashbury 
Morgan v. Illinois: TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO IN-
QUIRE WHETHER A POTEN-
TIAL JUROR WOULD AUTO-
MA TICALL Y IMPOSE THE 
DEATH PENALTY UPON CON-
VICTION WAS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT. 
In Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 
2222 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that during voir dire 
in a capital offense case a defendant is 
entitled to challenge for cause and have 
removed a juror who would automati-
cally impose the death penalty, irre-
spective of the facts of the case or the 
trial court's instructions. In so hold-
ing, the Court proposed a due process 
review standard which requires a trial 
court to question venire panels about 
their position on capital punishment. 
In the state of Illinois, capital of-
fense cases are tried in two phases. The 
same jury may determine both a 
defendant's guilt and the sentence, or 
the defendant may elect to waive sen-
tencing by the jury. Upon conviction 
for a capital offense, a separate sen-
tencing hearing is held to determine if 
aggravating and mitigating factors ex-
isted. A unanimous jury must find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least 
lout of 10 aggravating factors were 
present in order to sentence the defen-
dant to death. The defendant is given 
the death penalty if the defendant is 
eligible and the jury unanimously finds 
no mitigating factors. 
In 1990, Derrick Morgan was paid 
$4,000 by an inner-city gang to kill a 
narcotics dealer who was also his friend. 
Morgan lured the victim into an aban-
doned apartment and shot him in the 
head six times. After weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, an Illinois jury convicted the 
petitioner of first degree murder and 
sentenced him to death. 
At trial in the Circuit Court for 
Cook County, State prosecutors in-
voked their rights under Witherspoon 
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), in 
which the United States Supreme Court 
held that a state may excuse for cause 
any venire members whose strong op-
position to the death penalty would 
render them unable to impose death 
regardless ofthe circumstances. Con-
sequently, the trial judge asked those 
eventually empaneled whether any 
would automatically vote against the 
death penalty, irrespective ofthe facts. 
The trial judge denied a similar re-
quest by the defense for a "reverse-
Witherspoon" inquiry, which would 
have asked whether any juror would 
automatically vote to impose the death 
penalty regardless of the facts. Be-
cause the trial judge asked questions 
concerning the jurors fairness and im-
partiality during voir dire, the court 
found thatthe voir dire was ofthe same 
general nature as the "reverse-
Witherspoon" inquiry. Morgan, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2226. 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 
and held that the "reverse-Witherspoon" 
inquiry was not constitutionally re-
quired. It also found the Morgan jury 
fair and impartial because each juror 
had sworn to uphold the law and none 
expressed partial views. The United 
States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether, during voir dire 
for a capital offense, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires a trial court to refuse to ask 
whether a potential juror would auto-
matically impose the death penalty 
upon conviction. 
The Court first confirmed the im-
partiality requirement imposed upon a 
jury during the sentencing phase of a 
capital offense case. [d. at 2228. The 
Court invoked its decision in Turnerv. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), in 
which the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause required impartiality to the same 
extent required underthe Sixth Amend-
ment of any jury empaneled to decide 
a case. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. 
Next, the Court determined, in ac-
cordance with the holding in Wain-
wright v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985), 
that when a juror's views on capital 
punishment would impair the perfor-
mance of her duty to follow instruc-
tions, such a juror is not impartial and 
must be removed for cause. Morgan. 
112 S. Ct. at 2229. In support of its 
conclusion, the Court cited its decision 
in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 
(1988), in which a juror who would 
have automatically voted for the death 
penalty was removed by preemptory 
challenge. The Court determined that 
the failure to remove the juror forcause 
was error under the standard set forth 
in Witt. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. 
The Court next addressed whether 
a trial court must inquire into a juror's 
views on capital punishment upon a 
defendant's request. Voir dire, the 
Court stated, is a critical method of 
effectuating the criminal defendant's 
right to an impartial jury. [d. at 2230. 
Only with the proper voir dire can a 
trial judge fulfill the responsibility of 
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identifying and removing jurors who 
would "not be able impartially to fol-
low the court's instructions and evalu-
ate the evidence." Id. (quoting Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 
188 (1981». The Court, therefore, 
reiterated that because there was a right 
to challenge a juror based on bias, then 
there remained the right to propose 
questions designed to uncover bias. 
The trial judge would thereafter be 
responsible for determining if the chal-
lenge was proper. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2232. . 
Finally, the Court addressed the 
remaining issue of whether questions 
propounded by the trial court were 
sufficient to satisfy the petitioner's right 
to due process. Id. The Court deter-
mined that jurors who would ''unalter-
ably" either oppose or propose the 
death penalty in every case were inca-
pable of following the law in the per-
formance of their duties. Id. at 2233. 
The Court, therefore, concluded that a 
trial court's general questions concern-
ing fairness and impartiality would be 
insufficient to identify jurors with bi-
ased views about the death penalty. It 
would be possible, the Court added, for 
jurors to intend to uphold the law, but 
be unaware that dogmatic beliefs about 
the death penalty would prevent them 
from doing so. Id. The petitioner was 
thus entitled to ask specific questions 
which would identify jurors with pre-
determined opinions about whether or 
not to impose the death penalty regard-
less ofthe facts of the case. Id. at 2233. 
The Supreme Court in Morgan v. 
Illinois established that the Due Pro-
cess Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amend-
ment enables a capital defendant to 
challenge and remove for cause jurors 
whose views on capital punishment 
would lead them to automatically vote 
for the death penalty upon conviction. 
The decision is a significant victory for 
capital defendants and their attorneys 
because it aids their ability to ferret out 
jurors who hold unreasonable convic-
tions concerning capital punishment. 
Because most people perceive them-
selves as fair, general questions con-
ceming an individual's ability to judge 
fairly are insufficient inquiry for the 
purposes of identifying partiality 
among jurors. Furthermore, the inclu-
sion of capital defendants among those 
possessed with the ability to impose a 
Witherspoon inquiry balances the scales 
between the State's and the defendant's 
ability to successfully challenge jurors 
and remove them for cause. 
- Kim Germaine Judd 
New York v. United Stllles: TAKE 
TITLE PROVISION OF LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
POLICY AMENDMENT ACT 
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In New York v. United States, 112 
S. Ct. 2408 (1992), the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that the ''take 
title" provision of the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Amendment 
Actofl985 violatedtheTenthAmend-
ment of the United States Constitu-
tion. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court resolved a constitutional issue of 
the proper division of authority be-
tween the Federal Government and the 
States. The Court decided that al-
though Congress may encourage a state 
to provide for the disposal oflow level 
radioactive waste generated within its 
borders, it may not compel a state to do 
so. 
At the end ofthe 1970's, Congress 
faced an environmental crisis in the 
disposal oflow level radioactive waste. 
This type of waste, generated from 
sources as disparate as smoke alarms 
and medical fluids, must be isolated 
from humans for up to hundreds of 
years. Despite a crucial need for re-
positories of such waste, the number of 
disposal sites had dwindled. By 1979, 
the only operating disposal site in the 
country was in South Carolina. There-
fore, that state alone bore the burden of 
storing low level radioactive waste pro-
duced throughout the nation. To avert 
disaster, Congress responded by en-
acting the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act of 1980 ("1980 
Act"). The 1980 Act held each State 
responsible for the disposal of waste 
that it generated. A State could dispose 
of its waste at a disposal facility lo-
cated either within its borders or in 
another State with which it had reached 
a regional compact agreement. B~ 
cause the 1980 Act carried no penalty 
for non-compliance, by 1985 thirty-
one states had not joined a regional 
compact and were due to be excluded, 
leaving them no assured outlet for their 
low level radioactive waste. 
Faced with this prospect, Congress 
passed the Low-Level Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 ("1985 
Act"). Three incentives were created 
to encourage states to provide for dis-
posal of waste generated within their 
borders. First, monetary incentives in 
the form of payments from a desig-
nated escrow account would be made 
to States that complied with the statute's 
deadlines. Second, the deadlines were 
linked to access to the sites; thus, States 
that did not comply would be assessed 
progressively higher surcharges and 
eventually denied access completely. 
The third provision required that each 
State which failed to comply with the 
established deadline take title to the 
waste generated within its borders and 
be held liable for all damages incurred 
as a consequence of the State's failure 
to take possession. 
The State of New York chose to 
conform to the Act's requirements by 
passing legislation to provide for the 
siting and financing of a disposal facil-
ity in its state. The State ofNew York 
and residents of two of the counties in 
which sites had been proposed filed 
suit against the United States in the 
United States District Court for the 
NorthemDistrictofNewYorkseeking 
a declaratory judgment that the 1985 
Act was unconstitutional. They ac-
knowledged that Congress could regu-
late interstate commerce in waste ma-
terial under the Commerce Clause and 
that Congress could use the Supremacy 
Clause to pre-empt state regulation of 
radioactive waste. They claimed, how-
ever, that by directing the states to 
regulate in this field, Congress vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment. Nevada, 
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